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1.  Introduction
The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) ceased to exist on 15 January 
1992 but has been present in the international political discourse ever since thus opening 
space for discussion and analysis. The crisis of the late 1980s raised tensions and encouraged 
hatred among nationalist factions, resulting in brutal and humiliating wars. As Economides 
(1992, p. 4) states: “Violence in the Yugoslav context is an expression of discontent along 
a series of issues including ethnic, nationalist, religious, territorial, economic and political 
factors.” The wars in the former Yugoslavia “shocked the civilized West” (Lucarelli, 2000, 
p. 1) and sparked debate over credibility and capability not only with regard to the international 
community as such, but also of individual states and actors who were assigned important roles 
in the handling of the devastating situation. 
What scholarship immediately did was to point the blame at one or more subjects, most 
commonly at specific individuals, while at the same time sparing a number of crucial contrib-
uting factors from serious criticism. In his analysis, Robert Hayden (1999, p. 19) warns as 
how to approach the investigations in the field: 
Academic debates on the Former Yugoslavia are as polarized as those surrounding the 
creation of Israel or the partitioning of Cyprus, with criticism of a study often depend-
ing more on whether the work supports the commentator’s predetermined position than 
on the coherence of its theory or the reliability and sufficiency of its arguments. When 
one side in such a conflict wins politically, it usually also wins academically, because 
analyses that indicate that a politics that won is, in fact, wrong tend to be discounted. 
Political hegemony establishes intellectual orthodoxy.   
Here, I examine the existing scholarship and debate within the field of the social sciences 
and, in particular, the history closely related to the disintegration of Yugoslavia. I will argue 
that the collapse of Yugoslavia was stimulated by numerous causes, where most of them 
were interlinked and jointly contributed even more to the actual state disintegration. Before 
I present three issues that require deeper academic elaboration, I will briefly reflect upon the 
existing arguments which I broadly divide into two main categories: internal and external.
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2.  Internal factors
Internal elements are worthy of consideration for two reasons: first, due to their undeni-
able presence in any debate regarding the collapse and, second, because they are linked to 
external factors on a mutually inclusive and influential basis. Accordingly, the internal factors 
primarily focus on two individuals: Slobodan Milošević and Franjo Tuđman, thus Serbian and 
Croatian leaders at the time. The role performed by individuals requires serious consideration 
as their actions generated reactions in the crucial moments for the future of the Yugoslav 
state. 
Furthermore, the internal factors focus on three republics: Slovenia, Croatia and/or 
Serbia. Some scholars consider individual republics and their collective decisions as a driving 
force in the collapse of the SFRY. For example, Slovenia is often accused of being self-centred 
and disrespectful towards Belgrade. I do accept the existence of self-centred behaviour within 
Yugoslavia. Therefore, apart from Milošević, a malefactor bent on turning Yugoslavia into 
a Serb-dominated country or Tuđman, who desired a Croatian state for Croatians without 
guaranteeing equal rights to the Serbs living in Croatia, Slovenia deserves criticism for being 
self-centred within the Yugoslav federation and not interested in finding an appropriate 
solution for all the parties concerned. Although Glenny (1993, p. 97) maintains that Slovenia 
is indirectly responsible for the war in Croatia, meaning that “the accumulated tensions in 
Croatia had to express themselves through violence,” I, however, ignore the concept of cause 
and effect and talk rather about shared responsibility. This understanding finds its justification 
in Radan’s (2003, p. 161) equal blame at the door of both republics: “The Slovenian and 
Croatian declarations of independence in late June 1991 led to war in Yugoslavia.” What 
is relevant is that by the late 1980s, both Slovenia and Croatia started seeking ever closer 
relations with Western Europe, thus securing additional support for future secession. For 
example, within the economic field, both republics adopted an autonomous foreign policy 
through the Alps-Adriatic Work Community, a regional association aimed at fostering coop-
eration between Austria, Italy, Switzerland, Bavaria, Slovenia and Croatia. 
Finally, the internal factors focus on additional three arguments: nationalism, ancient 
hatreds and cultural diversities. Regarding these three arguments, I argue that we should not 
question their contribution to the disintegration of Yugoslavia, but rather understand them as 
back-up components in discourse used to justify certain domestic policies.  
3.  Economics: factor of connectivity 
The economic argument can be approached both from internal and external perspectives. 
If analysed within the Yugoslav state borders, the economic crisis in the late 1970s is what 
most academic writings concentrate on as it became evident that Yugoslavia’s future would 
depend on its economic performance. Susan Woodward in her book Socialist Unemployment 
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(1995, p. 364) correctly points out that the economic crisis caused constitutional conflict and 
thus the crisis of the Yugoslav state as such. In order to understand the specific situation at that 
time, she concludes that growing unemployment pushed the political elite to carry out certain 
policies, thus challenging “the system’s capacity to adapt to … new economic and social 
conditions” and “the country’s ability to continue to manage unemployment itself” further 
eroding the “balance in constitutional jurisdictions of the federal system.”
However, the validity of economic argument can be understood better if relations between 
Yugoslavia and the West are examined. Without going into detail over the ties between the 
two entities, Lane (2003, pp. 121-122) explains how their connectedness was cultivated: “At 
the heart of Tito’s foreign policy was the notion of sustaining a balance in Yugoslavia’s rela-
tions with both East and West, achieving ideological sustenance from a relationship with the 
communist movement as a whole, while benefiting from Western economic aid and (if need 
be) military support.” The response from the West was its “policy of ‘keeping Tito afloat,’ a 
phrase … which led the West to underwrite Yugoslav economic development until the end 
of the 1980s” (Ibid., p. 109). The price of this regime of economic dependence was paid by 
the SFRY in a number of different ways: it affected its reputation in the West, undermined its 
non-allegiance, deepened domestic frustration.
The economic changes the Yugoslav state was required to implement came from 
external sources, mostly international organizations, rather than domestic bodies. When the 
International Monetary Fund imposed policies on Yugoslavia in the 1980s, bringing unem-
ployment and double-digit inflation with them, central state polices shifted from protecting 
the people and the standard of living in general to attacking them (Mastnak, 1991). Such a 
situation, in Reuter’s (1991, p. 115) terms “turned Yugoslavia into the West’s worrisome child 
[and] Washington and Brussels started to fear that Yugoslavia’s economic breakdown might 
have unforeseeable political consequences.” Thus, at a certain point it became “fashionable in 
the West to be pessimistic about Yugoslavia’s future after Tito,” an approach justified by the 
re-emergence of the national issue that was always going to be difficult to solve peacefully 
(Johnson, 1974, p. 55). Later, the death of Tito and the collapse of the Yugoslav debt-ridden 
economy put the hegemony of Yugoslav ideology to the test (Bowman, 2005). 
4.  External factors
The main focus of this paper regards the role played by the external actors, in particular 
by the European Community. Accordingly, here, I examine major debates regarding 
Community’s involvement and contribution to the disintegration of the SFRY. I question 
whether lack of interest existed and if it did, how important it was for Yugoslavia’s future, 
then more significantly, why some Member States had greater power than the Community 
itself and what were the driving forces behind the decision-making processes that obviously 
influenced some leaders to adopt particular policies.  
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4.1.  Lack of whose interest?
In the late 1980s when collapse of the SFRY turned from being a possibility into prob-
ability, the European Community decided to leave the initiative to the local actors. Scholarship 
discussing this period points out that both the United States and the EC opted for preventive 
diplomacy—an approach that “revealed one of the weaknesses that subsequently hindered the 
mediations—the inability of the intervening states and the international organizations to speak 
in a single voice and convey a clear message to the disputing parties” (Touval, 2002, p. 15). In 
short, in regard to the American position, I argue that the US had no clear standpoint in regard 
to the Yugoslav crisis; it did not even need one. The US rhetoric of supporting Yugoslav 
unity changed as soon as in the late 1980s doing business with the Serbs no longer seemed 
possible: on 28 November 1990, the New York Times reported the opinion of US intelligence 
that the Yugoslav experiment had failed and “that federated Yugoslavia will break apart, 
most probably in the next 18 months, and that civil war in that multinational Balkan country 
is highly likely.”     
In regard to the European position, be that as it may, what is interesting about the EC is 
its apparent unawareness of the circumstances. It was the US who informed the EC about the 
deteriorating situation in the SFRY. As Zimmermann (1996, p. 65) puts it: 
the Europeans simply couldn’t believe that Yugoslavia was in serious trouble. There had 
been too many cries of wolf in the decade after Tito’s death in 1980, when practically 
everybody had predicted that the country would fall apart. When it didn’t, Europeans 
blinded themselves to the cataclysm that was now imminent … their approach to 
Yugoslavia was without any of the urgency with which they acted fourteen months later, 
when the breakup they said couldn’t happen was upon them.   
As indicated by the above mentioned arguments, the international community appeared 
bewildered. I argue that scholarship had not paid enough attention to the nature of the relations 
that developed between the West, and in particular the European Community, and Yugoslavia 
prior to 1991. In his brief account Yugoslavia: Why Did It Collapse?, Pavlowitch (2007, p. 
151) insists that while the West was enthusiastic about the first Yugoslavia “as the new state 
seemed to fit a new European order,” it therefore supported Tito from the beginning “as he 
was deemed the best chance for a united Yugoslavia, before it turned his regime into a bastion 
against Soviet advance in the Cold War and a hoped-for model for the development of the 
rest of Eastern Europe.” However, the author concludes that “the West’s understanding of 
Yugoslavia was illusory. It went on supporting Yugoslavia’s communist leadership to the 
very end, thus enabling Tito’s heirs to avoid real reforms.”
- 119 -
Europe 1989-2009: Rethinking the Break-up of Yugoslavia
4.2. “The hour for Europe has come”
I argue that the Yugoslav crisis was a European problem from the early beginning 
although for the Europeans the SFRY became a matter of interest only when the conflict 
seemed easy to deal with, thus, according to Buzan and Wæver (2003, p. 387), “boosting the 
EU foreign policy profile – as expressed in the infamous statement by Jacques Poos that ‘the 
hour for Europe has come’.” The paradox of this statement was twofold: first, it advocated 
how powerful the Europeans were by claiming that “if one problem can be solved by the 
Europeans, it is the Yugoslav problem. [Yugoslavia] is a European country and it is not up to 
the Americans” (cited in Almond, 1994, p. 32), and second, it was pronounced in a moment of 
complete ignorance and lack of serious strategy as to how to approach the Yugoslav problem. 
Obviously, the EC policy did not manage to resolve the crisis in the Balkans or prevent the 
spread of violence. 
The initial period—“the period without decisive external action” (Buzan and Wæver, 
2003, p. 383) – meant that each of the local actors hoped for the support of their influential 
friends abroad. The Slovenes and Croats sought support in Austria and Germany while the 
Serbs had a degree of consensus from the Russians. Once the conflict attracted global attention, 
the European players decided to step in; indeed, an opt-out strategy was no longer possible. 
Zimmermann (1996, p. 147) is critical of the approach: “The European Community leapt 
into the accelerating maelstrom with a pedagogical rather than a political approach. Without 
much understanding of the nationalist forces at play, the Europeans lectured the Yugoslavs as 
if they were all unruly schoolchildren whose naughtiness would deprive them of the sweets 
only Europe could provide.” 
Although not voluminous, the scholarship discussing the EC’s involvement fits into 
two groups: one, which concentrates on the Community’s recognition policy and its legal 
significance within broader international context, and other, which examines particular 
Member States and their undisputable power to influence decision-making at the EC level 
and therefore challenge some of the previously established norms.  The recognition policy 
was a turning point during the Yugoslav crisis. Again here, arguments somehow take both US 
and Europe into consideration. According to Thomas (2003, p. 3), the Yugoslav state was not 
destroyed “because of domestic struggles and militant Milošević-led Serbian nationalism,” 
but due to a Western ad hoc recognition policy which violated the 1975 Helsinki Accords 
Final Act guaranteeing territorial integrity of European state frontiers.
Equally important is the argument that questions the EC’s relation vis-à-vis its Member 
States. Initially, the Community spoke in the name of its twelve member states. But, consid-
ering that “the EC was almost willy nilly sucked into the crisis” (Lak, 1992, p. 175) the 
voices of the Member States carried more weight. By mid 1991 the EC faced a split over the 
Yugoslav problem. In his analysis, Cohen (1995, p. 46) puts it:
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German, Austrian and Italian political leaders, for example, were generally more 
sympathetic to the views advanced by the governments of Slovenia and Croatia for a 
confederation of sovereign states, whereas Serbian advocacy of a remodeled federation 
– though not necessarily according to the highly centralized perspectives of Milošević 
– were received more sympathetically in London and Paris. 
Therefore, the emergence of different points of view demanded a switch from a suprana-
tional to an inter-governmental approach in order to tackle the crisis. In her Balkan Tragedy, 
Woodward (1995, p. 183) criticizes the EC states for all becoming “increasingly vulnerable 
to German assertiveness” and the “German maneuver” that pressured other EC members 
to recognize Slovenia and Croatia: “The precedent set by the German maneuver was that 
the principle of self-determination could legitimately break up multinational states, that EC 
application of this principle was arbitrary, and that the surest way for politicians bent on 
independence to succeed was to instigate a defensive war and win international sympathy and 
recognition.”
However, the argument about German tactics had its supporters as well. For example, 
Daniele Conversi (1998, p. 64), justifies the German reaction, and thus recognition of the two 
republics. He says: 
[t]he idea that the German attitude expressed a deliberate will to ‘dismember Yugoslavia’ 
was easily invalidated… First, the German government acted in response to public 
pressure. Second, this pressure was shared by other European countries. Third, Germany 
acted only after initial hesitancy and considerable distress. These three factors alone can 
dispel the idea of a ‘deliberate plan to dismember Yugoslavia’. 
This opinion is supported by some other authors who contribute by saying that any 
discourse aimed at blaming Germany for its premature behaviour with regard to the recognition 
of Slovenia and Croatia is misplaced; according to them, it was not Germany that supported 
armed Serbs, but France and the United Kingdom, both “in effect prepared to see Croatia, 
and later Bosnia-Herzegovina be defeated by Serbia” (Lukić and Lynch, 1996, p. 271). It is 
worth recalling that the EC had agreed in July 1991 to postpone recognition of Croatia and 
Slovenia until October, until the three-month moratorium on independence relating to the 
secessionist republics had expired. Thus it was France and the United Kingdom who, through 
their opposition to recognition, affected the EC consensus, not Germany. 
5.  Gaps in academic scholarship 
All of the arguments mentioned above have significantly contributed to the under-
standing of the collapse of Yugoslavia. Although some of them are quite exclusive in their 
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nature, I argue that it is more appropriate to examine the Yugoslav crisis if looking through 
the conglomerate of various factors and their interconnectedness. Having said this, it is 
this missing link between internal and external factors that is worthy of examination. The 
Yugoslav example illustrates the relevance of the interaction between internal and external 
factors where non-state actors of undisputable power challenged and shaped decision-making 
processes. Thus, while having in mind the complicity of the relations between the Community 
and Yugoslavia prior to the crisis, my concern is focused on the role perpetrated by non-
state actors such as media, diasporas and churches. Decisions are often made, under unclear 
circumstances. In their analysis about decision making, Kroeber-Riel and Hauschildt (1987, 
p. 47) distinguish between collective and individual decisions and warn that while “[t]he 
participants in the decision making process may have specialized functions, which enhance 
productivity, but since the co-ordination of these specialists requires planning and adjustment, 
collective decision making may be a long drawn-out process.” I support this model as it can be 
used to examine decision-making processes during the Yugoslav crisis where the Community 
represents ‘collective’ and a Member State is an ‘individual.’           
The non-state actors should be examined separately. This way, we can understand 
what each actor’s contribution was and offer clear account of the policies adopted. Although 
the literature on non-state actors has been very limited, I argue that they can be of rather 
strategic significance. Apart from contributing to “the fragmentation of political responsi-
bility,” Sabl (2006, p. 250) concludes: “The more successful non-state actors are in affecting 
political outcomes, the more responsibility they should be asked to take for those outcomes.” 
Accordingly, I argue that media, diasporas and churches were the most powerful non-state 
actors in the process of the disintegration of Yugoslavia.
Firstly, when the media stepped in, wider perception of the crisis depended rather on 
what exactly the media had to say than what the factual situation was. In judging the coverage 
of the Yugoslav crisis, some scholars view Western propaganda as being directed against 
Serbs, while Conversi (1998, p. 47) is of the idea that the Belgrade political elite manipulated 
Western perception of the Yugoslav crisis and at the same time controlled the information 
reaching Western embassies in Belgrade, thus raising the question of lobbying. However, the 
literature briefly questions the role that Slovenian and Croatian media played and how they 
linked themselves to the media in the countries bearing a decisive function to facilitate their 
path towards independence. For example, Crawford (1996, p. 502) notes that media coverage 
of the war and the large Croatian community living in Germany might have influenced politi-
cians to support recognition of the Croatian republic. 
Secondly, debate over diaspora groups has been overlooked as well. Both politically and 
economically they play a significant role in contemporary social mechanisms. Some authors 
discuss their role during the Yugoslav crisis, but without dedicating much attention to the 
actions adopted in the eve of the disintegration of the state and more importantly what impact 
they exercised on the EC policies. For example, Gow and Carmichael (2000, p. 181) point out 
that the 1990 Slovene World Congress brought Slovenian émigrés around the world together 
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with a common goal: independence. As they put it: 
While it was important to spread the word everywhere and anywhere, it was quickly 
realised that an independent Slovenia would be in no position to establish links with all 
the eighty-four states with which the Yugoslav federation had diplomatic relations, let 
alone the eighty or so with which it had no link. Efforts were therefore concentrated on 
the shaping of foreign policy. This meant, among other things, secretly contacting as 
many of the small number of Slovenes in the Yugoslav diplomatic service as could be 
trusted, forging links with the larger Slovene émigré communities, and building links 
with neighbouring countries and especially with those capitals judged to be the most 
‘interesting’ for Slovenia in its current situation – most notably Washington, Bonn and 
Prague.
The discourse about Croatian diaspora has got more space in the literature. Apart from 
focusing on the financial assistance invested and the target countries, some authors concen-
trate on the evolution of both formal and informal contacts. In his discussion about the exile 
patriotism, Hockenos (2003) examines Croatian diaspora in Canada and the United States and 
clearly shows its greater involvement after 1987, first to back President Tudjman’s electoral 
campaign and consequently to support country’s fight for independence. However, he remains 
rather silent about diaspora activism in Europe – an argument worth consideration as the 
Croatian diaspora in Germany remarkably contributed to the overall development of the crisis 
and thus influenced the decision making processes.   
Finally, discourse over religious organizations and their policies should be addressed 
properly. In former Yugoslavia and especially once the conflict had commenced denomina-
tion played a critical role and belonging to one religious organization rather than another 
was a matter of importance. Moreover, in war torn territories, multiple identities disappear 
making way for the identity most closely related to the conflict: this identity is often outlined 
by religion (Huntington, 2002). However, the scholarship discussing religion often focuses on 
its internal dimension and disagreements arising from ethnic heterogeneity within the state. 
Based on this, Ramet (2002, p. 95) argues that “[a]s Serb-Croat polemics heated up in the 
course of the period 1989-1990, the Catholic Church was ineluctably drawn into the fire,” and 
therefore conclude that “religion was a social component of the forces that helped dismember 
the Yugoslav ‘experiment’.” 
I argue that more complete understanding of the Yugoslav ‘experiment’ is possible if 
external dimension of religion is taken into consideration as well. The cross-border power 
of Slovenian and Croatian Catholic churches to link themselves to the respective Catholic 
organizations within the European Community meant securing a back-up factor in their fight 
for independence. While the Serbian side enjoyed support for its expansionism from the Greek 
Orthodox Church, the two Catholic republics communicated with the Vatican City which 
openly lobbied for them. Since this permitted stronger incentive in regard to their position, 
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the literature has not demonstrated yet how the communication between them was handled, 
what strategy the informal contacts adopted and to what degree their activism influenced 
decision-making processes.      
6.  Conclusion
Lack of academic research concerning specific elements might affect the complete 
understanding of any important issue, and this is true also in the case of the disintegration of 
Yugoslavia. In her analysis, Dragović-Soso (2007, p. 28) warns that “scholarship does not 
exist in a vacuum but tends to be influenced by the dominant cognitive frameworks of its time 
and often seeks to respond to prevailing public perceptions and political debates.” However, 
the extensive literature on the collapse of Yugoslavia and EC involvement, very often lead 
to the conclusion that the conflict was inevitable, but I have not found any ‘good’ reason as 
to why it was so devastating and long-lasting. Hopefully, substantial explanations are yet to 
come. 
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ヨーロッパ 1989-2009：旧ユーゴスラビア連邦解体の再検討
ブラニスラヴ・ラデリッチ
旧ユーゴスラビア連邦の解体は、今日でも広く議論されている。学界においても、解
体をもたらした要因について（再）検討し、様々な理論を構築する試みが続けられて
いる。本稿では、まず、旧ユーゴスラビアで生じた現象について、学界ですでに多く
の検討が進められてきた側面について、国内要因、国内と国外をつなぐ経済要因、国
際要因の三つに分けて検討する。次に、これまでの研究ではあまり注目を浴びず、今
後、より研究が進められるべき側面について言及する。特に、メディア、ディアスポ
ラ・グループ、そして、教会といった、その活動が政策決定者や連邦の将来に影響を
与えてきたアクターが、危機の間に果たした役割について検討する。
